Category Archives: Space Policy

FISO: Summary of workshop on asteroid redirect mission

The latest presentation to the Future In-Space Operations (FISO) study group is now posted in the FISO Working Group Presentations Archive. Both slides (pptx) and audio (mp3) are available for the talk, Target NEO2: Workshop Summary and Next Steps – Rich Dissly , Ball Aerospace – August 28, 2013

This is quite an interesting overview and summary of the Target NEO workshop held back in July on the proposed NASA mission to move a small asteroid to the Earth-Moon system using an unmanned spacecraft and then do close-up examinations with astronaut missions to it. You can find the individual presentation files here and the executive summary here.

Note that the program is referred in some places as ARRM (Asteroid Robotic Redirect Mission) and other places as ARM (Asteroid Redirect Mission).

There is a lot of discussion about improving the search for Goldilocks objects, e.g.:

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There’s probably a good amount of sci-fi in it but I like this multi-dimensional graph from NASA’s Bill Gerstenmaier illustrating the various technological capabilities needed for a Mars crew mission and where asteroid missions and ISS activities contribute to those capabilities:

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Finding an ideal asteroid target is very difficult and may take longer than the current mission time scale allows:

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Space policy roundup – Aug.31.13

Here’s the latest collection of space policy items:

Space policy roundup – Aug.30.13 [Update]

Some recent space policy related items :

Update:

See also The Cold War Returns to Space – Greg Autry/Huffington Post

Oddly, while the White House has been a strong advocate for privatization in space, some Republican Senators and Members of Congress still envision America’s future in space as looking more like the Postal Service or Amtrak. They’ve subverted CCiCap and its predecessors by diverting funding to an old school, nationalized space program known as the Space Launch System (SLS), designed to eventually carry astronauts to Mars or the asteroids. This giant launch vehicle is not well suited for primary the job at hand – delivering Americans to the ISS and satellites to Low Earth Orbit. More recently the Capitol Hill opponents of New Space have moved to force these entrepreneurial firms into the same Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) model that has corrupted big government aerospace projects for years. All of this delays America’s return to space in a blatant effort to protect socialized space jobs in Alabama and Texas.

Neil deGreasse Tyson says Elon Musk can’t get to Mars:  Neil deGrasse Tyson On Elon Musk SpaceX – Business Insider.

There are several factors that Tyson is overlooking:

  • Musk is saying that Mars can only be affordable for private entities if the costs are drastically lowered.
  • Musk’s goal is for SpaceX to achieve drastically lower costs by developing fully, rapidly reusable launch vehicles.
  • Since propellants make up less than half a percent of the current cost of getting to orbit, full reusability could lower costs by as much as a factor of 100 over the current cost of getting to orbit.
  • The only progress being made in lowering space transportation costs is in the private sector.
  • If SpaceX succeeds in lowering costs that much, they can in fact make lots of money in selling transportation ranging from commercial spacecraft to people buying ride to Mars.
  • Tyson continues to ignore the many, many examples of private entities leading the exploration of a frontier, e.g. Columbus voyages were funded by Italian banks, polar exploration was mostly privately funded, IBM research has won several Nobel prizes, etc.

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Update 2: NASA may finally get a 2013 budget: JWST, Commercial Crew Spared Cuts in NASA FY2013 Operating Plan – SpacePolicyOnline.

Space policy roundup – Aug.28.13

Some space policy related items

SLS/Orion program likely to see cost overruns, delays

James Dean has written a report on costs overruns and delays that will likely start to hit the Space Launch System/Orion capsule program in the coming years: Faith in rocket’s progress stumbles: NASA: Budget’s structure makes cost overruns, delays likely – Forida Today. The video shown here earlier goes with this article.

NASA strives for at least 70 percent confidence that programs over $250 million will come in on time and budget, but Bolden said he suspected the heavy-lift rocket might fall short “for a variety of reasons, mainly having to do with reserves.”

“So then, you have to decide, OK, how much risk do you want to accept if you’re going to go below this level?” he told the NASA Advisory Council on July 31.

As Rick Boozer discussed in his book, The Plundering of NASA: an Exposé, a Booz Allen Hamilton study of SLS/Orion in 2011 said that the program would meet its cost and schedule for the first 3-5 years but that the agency was far too  optimistic for subsequent years : Executive Summary: Independent Cost Assessment [ICA] of the Space Launch System, Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle And 21St Century Ground Systems Programs – Booz Allen Hamilton (pdf).

Finding: The Programs’ estimates are serviceable and can be used for near-term budget planning in the current 3 to 5 year budget horizon. Beyond this horizon, the inclusion of large expected cost savings in the estimates, the beginning of development activities, and the potential for significant risk events decreases the ICA Team’s confidence in the estimates.
[…]
Finding: There are many instances of unjustified cost reductions in the Program estimates. This exposes the Programs to cost risk and undermines the credibility of the estimate. Cost reductions were generally observed in either of two categories: scope reductions where the removed work will likely be required, or the application of anticipated efficiencies (production, competition, etc.) that NASA has not historically achieved. In some cases the efficiencies leading to cost reductions are not explicitly identified. Both of these categories lower the estimates below what historical data suggests and indicate that the estimates are optimistic
[…]
Finding: Programs lack sufficient reserves to cover their Protect Scenarios. Program reserves were applied independent of the level of cost and schedule risk. Quantitative risk/sensitivity analyses have not been performed on any estimates.
[…]
Finding : Program estimates were shaped to fit within an anticipated budget profile. While this is common practice, it is not consistent with GAO cost estimating best practices. Shifting costs to later years to fit upcoming budget caps decreases each Program’s availability of funds for risk reduction, technology maturation, and exposes the Programs to out -year co st growth.